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THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF CREDIT IN EARLY 
MODERN VENICE: RULES, PRACTICES, TRANSCRIPTS* 
JAMES E. SHAW 
Department of History, University of Sheffield 
 
ABSTRACT. Evidence from the Piovego, the fraud magistracy of early modern 
Venice, offers a critical perspective on the documentary record of credit and the 
ways in which this was used in practice. Although it was formally illegal to charge 
interest on personal loans, a variety of legal fictions were employed to evade the 
ban. Such fictions significantly reduced the transparency and certainty of exchange, 
pushing personal loans into a world of semi-OHJDOLW\7KLVZDVDµEDURTXHHFRQRP\¶
in which people were aware of the potential discrepancy between surface form and 
underlying substance, and private agreements might be contested on grounds of 
VXEVWDQWLYHIDLUQHVV7KHµKLGGHQWUDQVFULSWV¶SUHVHQWHGE\OLWLJDQWVLQGLFDWHWKDWWKH
IRUPDOUHFRUGPXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHGWKURXJKDµWKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ¶WKDWFRQVLGHUVLWVUROH
as a resource in a broader process of negotiation)DUIURPEHLQJDµPDUNHW¶
characterized by price competition, choice, and transparency, the informal economy 
of credit was embedded in long-term power relationships. Rather than celebrating 
intermediaries such as brokers and notaries as facilitators of µPDUNHW¶UHODWLRQVZH
need to understand them as part of a hierarchical network of power and wealth., 
embedded in long-term relationships. 
 
Imagine borrowing £50, but signing a note declaring that you had received £100. 
Imagine signing a mortgage contract where the lender pretended to give you the 
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money in front of witnesses, but you had to give it back after they had gone. Imagine 
promising to pay £100 for second-hand clothes worth half that amount. These were 
methods of concealing the interest on loans, partly to avoid liability under the usury 
laws, and partly due to an idiom of friendship and gift that masked the true nature of 
exchange. How does this change the way that we should approach the documentary 
record of credit and contract? What are the problems of taking data from such 
documents at face value? This paper uses evidence from the Piovego (the fraud 
magistracy of early modern Venice) to explore the relationship between rules and 
practice, between the formal level of the economy as recorded in official 
documentation, and the informal level of negotiated relations, where things were 
more ambiguous and uncertain. At the Piovego, litigants could present a wide range 
of informal evidence to situate transactions in the wider context of social relations. 
This alternative story offers a critical perspective on the formal documentary record 
of credit and the purposes that this served. 
I 
7KHFRQFHSWRIWKHµLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\¶RULJLQDWHGLQWKHZRUNRIDQWKURSRORJLVW.HLWK
Hart.1 It referred to a bundle of loosely related characteristics: absence of recording, 
evasion of rules and taxes, improvised rather than regular behaviour, private rather 
than public transactions.2 The concept highlighted the role of makeshift solutions 
adopted by marginalized groups; for H[DPSOHKLVWRULDQVVKRZHGKRZZRPHQ¶V
contributions to the economy were often unrecorded.3 Although the informal 
economy was initially regarded as a feature of the less developed world, scholars 
subsequently came to recognize its importance in µPRGHUQ¶DVZHOODVµWUDGLWLRQDO¶
societies.4 Political economists see the informal economy as a structural feature of 
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late capitalism: multinational corporations subcontract production to weakly-
regulated labour in the developing world while concealing financial assets through 
offshore trusts.5 Real economies demonstrate a combination of formal and informal 
characteristics, which mark the end points of a continuum.6  
Recognition of the continuum between formal and informal was a key aspect 
RIWKHµQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOHFRQRPLFV¶1,(VFKRODUVUHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHDEVWUDFW
markets envisaged by neoclassical economic theory were not to be found in reality. 
Rather, markets were always reliant upon institutions that facilitated coordination 
between the parties ± these were thHVKDUHGµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶WKDWHQDEOHGSHRSOH
WRWUXVWHDFKRWKHU6XFKµUXOHV¶ZHUHLQWHUSUHWHGEURDGO\VRDVWRHQFRPSDVVD
range of informal social obligations, cultural norms, and traditions.7 For some, this 
suggested an optimistic vision where solutions to coordination problems emerged 
naturally from society, rather than being imposed by the state. A good example is the 
way Hernando de Soto celebrates µH[WUDOHJDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶IRURYHUFRPLQJVWDWH
regulations.8 Their decision to operate in the informal sector is regarded as a rational 
choice based on appraisal of the costs and benefits, rather than the result of 
structural relations of dependency. Applied historically, such perspectives have been 
FULWLFL]HGDVFRQVWLWXWLQJDVRUWRIµHFRQRPLFLPSHULDOLVP¶E\ZKLFKPDUNHWDQDO\VLVLV
applied to the premodern era.9 All institutions, whether formal or informal, are 
evaluated in terms of efficiency, by which entire cultures can be judged according to 
how far they conform to market logics.10 
Historians of early modern law and economy have recognized the close 
interlinkage of formal and informal levels, although generally rejecting simplistic 
QDUUDWLYHVDERXWµVXSHULRU¶FXOWXUDOSDWKZD\V6RFLDOSHUVSHFWLYHVLQGLFDWHWKDWIRUPDO
contracts provide additional legal underpinning for what are usually open-ended and 
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flexible relationships.11 Contracts should not necessarily be taken at face value, but 
understood in terms of how they were used in a broader bargaining process.12 This 
process of negotiation took place using a range of institutional resources: from 
entirely tacit exchanges within the family and household, to informal obligations 
enforced by community norms, to certified transactions backed by the force of law. 
Credit relations were deeply embedded in the dense interpersonal relationships of a 
KLHUDUFKLFDOVRFLHW\LQZKLFKSHRSOH¶VFKRLFHVZHUHVWURQJO\FRQVWUDLQHGE\LQIRUPDO
norms and obligations.13 This was further reinforced by a prevailing cultural ethic of 
debt forgiveness and by legal systems that emphasized flexibility and mediation.14 
7KHHDUO\PRGHUQSHULRGFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVµWUDQVLWLRQDO¶LQWKDWWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
community-based negotiation of personal debt came to be flanked by formal 
processes of certification and dispute resolution in local and central law courts, but 
WKHODWWHUZHUHDOVRFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\µQHJRWLDWLRQDQGGLVFUHWLRQ¶15 Formal 
certification increased the security of creditors to some extent, but nothing was ever 
certain ± debtors might negotiate more time, prevaricate, litigate, disappear, die, 
become insolvent or declare bankruptcy.16 Different forms of certification spanned 
the spectrum from formal to informal, with varying degrees of cost and certainty, but 
even in the most formal contract, it was never clear how, when, and to what extent 
the debt would be repaid. 
Underlying this lack of certainty was a fundamentally different approach to 
contract. In contrast to the positivism of the nineteenth century, early modern legal 
culture placed less emphasis on contracts as literally expressing the will of the 
parties and more on their role as evidence of the underlying agreement.17 In 
SUHPRGHUQOHJDOFXOWXUHµJRRGIDLWK¶PHDQWWKDWWKHSDUWLHVZHUHQRWERXQGRQO\WR
the letter of the contract but more broadly to the unwritten moral obligations of what 
5 
 
ZDVFRQVLGHUHGµIDLU¶$FWLQJLQFRQVFLHQFHPHDQWWKDWµQRRQHVKRXOGEHHQULFKHGDW
DQRWKHU¶VH[SHQVH¶18 Even if entered into willingly and knowingly, contracts might 
VWLOOEHFRQWHVWHGDVµIUDXGXOHQW¶RQJURXQGVRIVXEVWDQWLYHXQIDLUQHss. This is 
particularly important with regard to credit, since (as will be shown) interest 
payments were typically concealed by manipulating the details of the contract. This 
ILWVWKHSLFWXUHRIDµEDURTXHHFRQRP\¶LQZKLFKSHRSOHZHUHDZDUHRIWKHSRWHQtial 
discrepancy between surface form and underlying substance.19 Contemporaries 
UHJDUGHGWKHIRUPRIWKHFRQWUDFWDVDQRXWHUµFUXVW¶RUµVNLQ¶± LWZDVQRWWKHµVSLULW¶RI
the agreement.20 Historians need to go beyond regarding formal records as a 
providing a transparent description of transactions; rather, we need to understand 
their use in the ongoing process of negotiating debt relationships inside and outside 
the courtroom.21  
Using the Piovego records, we can apply this perspective to the most formal 
records of the early modern period, notarial instruments. In Roman law systems, 
notarial certification was usually the most important private means of formally 
registering a contract.22 Contemporary scholar Antoine Furetière regarded the notary 
DVWKHµNHHSHU RISXEOLFIDLWK¶DPDQRIFRPSOHWHYLUWXHDQGLQFRUUXSWLELOLW\µIDOVH
QRWDULHV¶KHZURWHZRXOGLQWURGXFHµWRWDOGLVRUGHUDQGFRQIXVLRQLQWKHZRUOG¶23 
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal accept this idealized vision, portraying 
QRWDULHVDVµVWDUV¶ZKo provided honest and transparent information in a competitive 
market.24 Yet their interpretation of notaries as facilitators of market relations 
neglects questions of corruption, fraud, and asymmetric power.25 Contemporaries 
were well aware of the ways in which notaries might manipulate the legal record.26 
7KHSUHDFKHU*LURODPR6DYRQDURODUHIHUUHGWRµQRWDULHVZKRGUDZXSEDGFRQWUDFWV¶
alongside usurers.27 Jean de Croset, 1610, described notaries who drew up 
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IUDXGXOHQWGRFXPHQWVDVµZROYHV¶LQDµVKHHSIROG¶28 Tommaso Garzoni, in his satire 
of the professions, commented that disguising interest was standard practice for 
QRWDULHVµVRPHWLPHV\RXGRQ¶WHYHQKDYHWRDVNIRUWKHPWRSUHSDUHDXVXULRXV
LQVWUXPHQW¶29 These views are also supported by the Piovego evidence.30 
II 
The Piovego was given responsibility for prosecuting usury at the end of the 
thirteenth century.31 Like a number of other Venetian magistracies, it took an 
equitable approach to justice, in which the judges were permitted to exercise 
arbitrium: that is, to go beyond the written law to do what was just for the particular 
case.32 This did not mean that the judges could decide whatever they liked, but 
UDWKHUWKDWWKH\DGKHUHGWRFXVWRPDQGWRRNDQDSSURDFKEDVHGRQWKHµIDFWVRIWKH
FDVH¶33 Informal sources of certification such as witness testimony or private 
accounts were therefore admitted alongside formal public documentation. One of the 
FRXUW¶VNH\IXQFWLRQVZDVWRDOORZOLWLJDQWVWRFRQWHVWHYLGHQFHWKDWZDVQRUPDOO\
decisive: the court was assigned authority over fraud as well as usury in response to 
the way that legal fictions were used to disguise interest charges. A law of 1328 
SHUPLWWHGWKHMXGJHVWRGHWHUPLQHPDWWHUVRIµLOOLFLWDQGIUDXGXOHQWFRQWUDFWV¶
DFFRUGLQJWRµFRQVFLHQFH¶µFRQVLGHULQg not the written form, but the quality of the 
IDFW¶DQGUHIHUULQJWRWKHµH[TXLVLWHIUDXGV¶WKDWFRQFHDOHGXVXU\ZLWKµYHLOVDQG
FRORXUV¶.34 ,QWKLVODZZDVH[WHQGWRFRYHUµGU\H[FKDQJH¶WKHWHFKQLTXHRI
using fictional currency exchange to conceal interest-bearing loans.35 Similar 
techniques are described in sixteenth-century English legal manuals, which describe 
WKHµIDOVHVKLIWVDQGFKHYLVDXQFHV¶XVHGWRGLVJXLVHXVXU\36 7KHµQDNHGSDFW¶
required clothing in formalities to have legal force, but the risk was that the true 
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nature of the agreement might be disguised, concealing a corrupt body with fine 
clothes. 
Fraud cases were exceptions to the norm, and only a fragmentary record 
survives of what was already a special group of cases: 322 complaints over the 
period 1600 to 1700, an average of only three per annum.37 In some cases, only the 
initial complaint survives; in others, there are bulky folders containing all the proofs 
presented by both parties. Often no records survive for years at a time. The 
separate, comprehensive, registers of sentences indicate an average of fifty 
sentences per annum at the start of the century to just over twenty per annum by the 
end of the century.38 To generate this number of sentences, the number of 
complaints must have been much higher, because only 18% of complaints were 
pursued to a verdict ± the majority were either abandoned or settled out-of-court.39 
Taking this into account, a realistic estimate is that 140 complaints were registered at 
the Piovego each year. Even so, these figures are insignificant compared to the 
Petizion, the most important Venetian court for handling credit disputes, where four 
to five claims were presented each working day in the mid-seventeenth century.40 
Although the identities of plaintiffs and defendants were not systematically 
recorded, they give some indication of the social range of litigants. Possession of 
QREOHWLWOHLVDJRRGPHDVXUHRIWKHFRXUW¶VLQFOXVLYLW\± nobles made up 5% of 
plaintiffs, a little higher than the proportion of the population,41 but 12% of 
defendants, indicating their greater prominence as creditors. Similarly, Jews made 
up less than 2% of plaintiffs, roughly in proportion with the population, but 6% of 
defendants. Where present, occupational titles indicate that the court was used by a 
wide variety of people: dyers, fishermen, clerks, cheesemongers, barbers, printers, 
merchants. Occupational titles are more commonly found among defendants (15%) 
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than among plaintiffs (8%), suggesting the particular importance of merchants, 
shopkeepers, and craftsmen in providing credit. Women were in general 
underrepresented, but were more prominent as plaintiffs (12%) than as defendants 
(7%). This is perhaps surprising considering the important role of women in credit, 
especially widows investing their dowries, but probably reflected the fact that women 
could also use the court to contest fraudulent dowry and inheritance settlements 
against the wishes of their male kin.42 There is some indication that the court 
favoured defendants (61% of verdicts), but the data are limited. More frequently, 
complaints were dropped, either formally withdrawn by the plaintiff, or simply 
abandoned, perhaps as a result of a settlement, financial exhaustion or because a 
delay was all that the plaintiff wanted. Even if a verdict was obtained, this did not 
necessarily mean the end of the dispute, since it was always possible to make an 
appeal.43 The extensive guarantees, multiple courts with overlapping jurisdictions, 
and appeal rights, meant that property rights were rarely certain. There are for 
example cases of land sales being contested many years later.44 
In contrast to the Petizion, where it was typically creditors to present claims, 
the Piovego was primarily a court where debtors sought to delay or evade making 
payment: by registering a querela (complaint) they could obtain suspension of 
proceedings initiated against them elsewhere. If the verdict went in their favour then 
an apparently legitimate contract might be voided. Litigants worked closely with 
lawyers to ensure that their arguments, supporting evidence, and choices of 
vocabulary functioned within the legal discourse of contract, usury, and fraud.45 
Although the truth of any individual case cannot be known, these alternative 
narratives highlight the discrepancy between the documentary record and the 
underlying practices of the informal economy. Plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that 
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the true facts of the case were not as they seemed, and that this warranted making 
an exception to the ordinary rules of contract. To do so, litigants presented narratives 
to situate the formal record in the broader context of the relationship between the 
SDUWLHV7KHµKLGGHQWUDQVFULSWV¶RIWKHIUDXGFDVHVRIIHUDFULWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHIURP
which to interpret the public record of credit, how it came into existence and how it 
was used.46 
III 
The Piovego cases provide a great deal of evidence on how formal contracts were 
manipulated to conceal the illegal payment of interest. One simple method was 
discounting, where the stated value of the loan exceeded the money actually 
received. Shopkeeper Baldin Guerra described how when he borrowed D1,032 from 
the Jew Salamon Camis, he was obliged to sign a credit note for D1,200.47 The 
same result could be obtained by requiring the borrower to pay the interest up front, 
but without recording this payment.48 Although it is not possible to estimate to what 
extent such fictions were exceptions to the norm, there is evidence that similar 
techniques were used wherever usury laws were in place, across early modern 
Europe and the Middle East.49 Similarly, just because a contract states that the loan 
ZDVµJUDWXLWRXV¶GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\PHDQWKDWQRLQWHUHVWZDVFKDUJHG50 The 
prices given in contracts and accounts were not necessarily what they seemed, and 
(as will be shown) such fictional elements might also be incorporated into notarial 
documents. 
Another exploit, called the stocco or barocco, was to make the loan in the 
form of overpriced goods.51 Since the borrower was interested in obtaining cash, the 
goods were often immediately returned to the creditor, or transferred to third parties 
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to be pawned or sold; indeed, they might never be delivered to the debtor at all. 
Sometimes goods might be junk of purely symbolic value, or might be entirely 
fictional.52 It was for this reason that in 1479 it was ruled that contracts must specify 
the precise quality, quantity, and colours of goods, and that these must be effectively 
transferred.53 Jewish dealers were prominent in many of these transactions due to 
their links to the second-hand trade, receiving, selling, and pawning goods on behalf 
of debtors.54 Bortolo Cardinal described purchasing Cairene carpets on credit from 
WKH-HZ0LFKLHO&DOLPDQLµZKLFK,QHYHUVDZZDVQHYHUVKRZQDQGQHYHUKDG¶55 
Although he signHGDGHEWQRWHIRU'WKHFDUSHWVUDLVHGRQO\'LQFDVKµWKLV
pretence was intended to conceal the usury, which increased the sum of D37 to D60, 
ZKLFKLVDOPRVWGRXEOH¶56 Cardinal had to repay the debt in two instalments over a 
period of twenty months, an amortizing loan equivalent to 47.1% interest per annum. 
Although debtors could attempt to show that the goods were worth less than the 
value stated in the contract, it was difficult to prove this if the goods were no longer in 
their possession. 
The Piovego evidence underlines the importance of situating individual 
transactions within the context of a developing credit relationship. Documents 
apparently recording sales of goods or loans of money could serve as a mask for the 
payment of interest on old debts. Cardinal described a second loan for D24, this time 
disguised as the sale of a robe. In fact he received neither the robe nor the money, 
EHFDXVHWKHµVDOH¶DFWXDOO\UHSUHVHQWHGWKHUHQHZDORIDSUH-existing loan of D15, 
plus a further D9 in fresh interest charges. In this way his creditor was able to charge 
FRPSRXQGLQWHUHVWRUDV&DUGLQDOSXWLWµXVXU\XSRQXVXU\¶57 Similarly, Baldin 
Guerra described how his creditor incorporated the interest into the principal, year 
DIWHU\HDU*XHUUD¶VILUVWORDQ of 1665 for the notional sum of D1,200, was rolled into 
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a new loan of D1,400 in 1666, which included a new interest charge (at 17% per 
annum). By 1669, his debt had grown to D1,950.58 
The disguising of the price of loans reflects one way in which the economy of 
SHUVRQDOFUHGLWGLGQRWIXQFWLRQDVDµPDUNHW¶$QRWKHUZDVWKHZD\WKDWWUDQVDFWLRQV
were embedded in personal relationships, with minimal competition. Intermediaries 
played a prominent role in the early modern urban economy, reflecting a general lack 
of information.59 However, this was particularly true in the case of personal credit, 
where the usury restrictions made it impossible for a public market to operate. Both 
parties had a strong preference for privacy: lenders needed to protect themselves 
from incrimination and borrowers also preferred discretion, since being known to 
QHHGFDVKFRXOGGDPDJHRQH¶VUHSXWDWLRQZLWKRWKHUFUHGLWRUV$VDUHVXOWLWZDVQRW
possible for borrowers to shop around to find the best deal. Instead, they relied on 
their personal networks to obtain loans, borrowing from relatives in the first instance, 
and often making use of intermediaries to go beyond this circle. Bortolo Cardinal 
never dealt with his creditor directly, but exclusively by means of the Jewish brothers 
Ventura and Lazzaro Grassini, who negotiated the deal and used their contacts to 
convert the goods into cash. The use of intermediaries was also a response to risk: 
in contrast to a cash sale, lenders needed to know something about borrowers ± 
what assets did they possess, what were their connections, how reliable were they? 
Intermediaries acted to screen potential borrowers through a process of 
recommendation.60 
Rather than intermediaries acting as neutral facilitators of market relations, 
they were embedded in hierarchical relations of dependency. This was not a level 
playing field, but functioned as a network of patronage and favour. Many of the 
Piovego complaints describe collusion between intermediaries and creditors. 
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Francesco Mutti described how he had purchased woollen cloth with a notional price 
of D4,000 from Francesco Grana by means of the intermediary Menachen Coen, a 
-HZLVKEDQNHU7KHJRRGVZHUHQRWGHOLYHUHGWR0XWWLEXWWR&RHQ¶VEDQNLQWKH
ghetto, where they were sold to raise D2,000 in cash.61 Mutti complained that Coen 
acted as the trusted agent of Grana rather than as a neutral intermediary, as he put 
LWµ&RHQFDPHWRRIIHUPHWKH«GXFDWVDVDIDYRXUWR*UDQDUDWKHUWKDQWR
PH¶62 *UDQDZDVLQIDFWDPDMRULQYHVWRULQ&RHQ¶VEDQNDQGHmployed him as his 
financial agent for at least ten years.63 
The particularly close relationships of trust established between creditors and 
intermediaries reflected the illegal nature of such loans. Intermediaries had access to 
sensitive information and one of their most delicate functions was to shield creditors 
from damaging allegations. When questioned in court, they typically claimed 
ignorance of the details, insisting that these were private matters for the parties 
DORQHDVRQHLQWHUPHGLDU\SXWLWµWhese matters of 14% and other usuries are 
handled face-to-IDFH¶64 Although Coen admitted that Grana and Mutti often met in 
his house to discuss business, he claimed to have no knowledge of the details. 
Despite torturing Coen, the judges got nothing more ouWRIKLPUHJDUGLQJ*UDQD¶V
activities.65 To encourage Coen to remain silent, Grana sent legal advisors to speak 
WRKLPLQSULVRQDQGWRRNFDUHRIKLVIDPLO\¶VQHHGV$JDLQWKLVZDVDQLQGLFDWLRQRI
the close mutual interests of intermediaries and creditors. 
Similarly, notaries were not always impartial facilitators of market relations, 
but might serve as the trusted agents of creditors. Notaries were complicit in the 
fictions that were used to dress loans in a legally acceptable form, which included 
theatrical or ritual elements used to comply with the law. Francesco Mutti described 
how bags of money were brought out for show, but they were not actually consigned 
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WRKLP:KHQLQWHUURJDWHGWKHQRWDU\3LHWUR%UDFFKLGHIHQGHGKLPVHOIILHUFHO\µ,
have told the truth as a man of law, and complete integrity, nor would I favour one of 
WKHSDUWLHVIRUDOOWKHJROGLQWKHZRUOGZKHUHLWLVDPDWWHURIUHSXWDWLRQ¶66 He 
GHVFULEHGKRZµWZREDJVRIJROGZHUHHPSWLHGLQP\SUHVHQFH¶EXWDGPLWWHGWKDWWKH
money was not counted and claimed not to know whether Mutti had actually kept it 
afterwards.67 Questioned on the possible fictions in the contract, he claimed that it 
ZDVQRWKLVUROHWRFHUWLI\ZKHWKHUJRRGVZHUHDFWXDOO\GHOLYHUHGVWDWLQJµWKH
confession of debtors is sufficient, as is practised every day, and the protocols of the 
QRWDULHVDUHIXOORIVXFKGHHGV¶68 In his view, what mattered was the voluntary 
confession of the parties, rather than the objective truth of the transaction. This was 
the logic of formal contract ± if the parties entered an agreement of their free will, 
then any notion of substantial fairness was irrelevant. However, that was not the 
sense of the Venetian usury laws, which insisted that money must be effectively 
transferred.69 
%UDFFKL¶VGHIHQFHWKDWQRWDULHV¶DUFKLYHVZHUHµIXOORIVXFKGHHGV¶LPSOLHGWKDW
such fictions were typical practice. Nevertheless, it was always a delicate matter, in 
which notaries needed to be discreet about the true nature of their business. 
Establishing close relationships with trusted notaries was of key importance in 
getting business done safely, treading the fine line between certification and 
incrimination. As one witness testified, the creditor Francesco Grana had business 
ZLWK%UDFFKLDOPRVWHYHU\GD\µEHLQJKis compare DQGIULHQG¶70 As experts in 
ensuring that contracts were legally valid, notaries might take the initiative in 
proposing solutions. Another notary involved in the case, Andrea Calzavara, advised 
the parties that the mortgage deed would not be valid with the specified interest 
SD\PHQWVDQGVRµLWZDVQHFHVVDU\WRILQGDZD\WKDWLWDSSHDUHGWKDW,>0XWWL@KDGD
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ELJJHUGHEW¶71 Strikingly, many of the same notaries appear repeatedly in Piovego 
cases, suggesting that they were specialists in this sort of contractual manipulation. 
In another case, the creditor Gambirasi wanted the mortgage contract to state 
WKDWWKHPRQH\KDGEHHQSDLGEXWWKHQRWDU\DGYLVHGKLPµ\RXFDQ¶WGRWKLV± you 
QHHGWREULQJWKHPRQH\DQGFRXQWLWLQIURQWRIWKHZLWQHVVHV¶72 Gambirasi went 
KRPHUHWXUQHGZLWKDUHGEDJDQGWKHQZLWKRXWJHWWLQJRXWWKHPRQH\RXWµKHKDG
the notary declare that he had paid the money in the presence of notary and 
ZLWQHVVHVEXWLQIDFWQRPRQH\HYHUSDVVHGIURPKLVKDQGVWRP\KDQGV¶DFFRUGing 
to Libanoto, the plaintiff).73 Gambirasi appealed to the sanctity of contract, arguing 
WKDWµWKHDVVHWVDQGIDFXOW\RIHYHU\IDPLO\UHVWVRQQRWDULDOIDLWKZKLFKFDQQRWDQG
VKRXOGQRWEHSODFHGLQGRXEW¶RWKHUZLVHHYHU\WKLQJZRXOGEHWKURZQLQWRµKRUUible 
FRQIXVLRQ¶HFKRLQJWKHODQJXDJHRI)XUHWLqUHVHHDERYH74 For his part, the notary 
XSKHOGWKHILFWLRQRIWKHWUDQVIHUVWDWLQJWKDWµ,VDZJROG¶DQGµ,SUHVXPHLWZDVWKH
true quantity expressed in the deed, because I saw that Signor Libanoto was 
cRQWHQW¶75 ,WZDVWKHQRWDU\¶VUROHWRHQVXUHWKDWFRQWUDFWVZHUHOHJDOO\YDOLGDQGWR
advise clients accordingly. 
When questioned, witnesses to such contracts generally claimed to know 
nothing of the details of the transaction, such as the price, the interest rate, or the 
quality of goods ± their role was merely to certify the consent of the parties. As 
Tommaso Garzoni satirically commented, notaries could have their pick of 
IDYRXUDEOHZLWQHVVHVµZLWKRXWDQRXQFHRIFRQVFLHQFH¶76 Often they were servants 
oUIULHQGVRIWKHQRWDU\ZKRZHUHSUHVHQWRQO\WRZLWQHVVWKHVLJQDWXUHV%UDFFKL¶V
ERDWPDQWHVWLILHGWKDWµHYHU\GD\KH>%UDFFKL@KDGPHDFWDVZLWQHVV¶77 Another 
witness described how Bracchi asked him to be present at the signing of two 
FRQWUDFWVµEXW,GRQ¶WNQRZDQ\WKLQJRIWKHLUFRQWHQW¶78 Nor were witnesses able to 
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testify to the quality of goods ± DVDZLWQHVVLQWKH0XWWLFDVHVWDWHGµ,GLGQ¶WVHH
WKHP¶$VIRUZKHWKHUWKHSULFHZDVH[FHVVLYHKHVWDWHGµWKHXVXDOFXVWRPLVWKDW
this is establishHGE\DJUHHPHQWRIWKHFRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHV«VR,GRQ¶WNQRZLIWKH\
ZHUHZRUWKPRUHRUOHVVWKDQWKHFRQWUDFWVWDWHV¶79 Despite Venetian laws insisting 
that contracts were only valid if the quality and quantity of goods and money were 
effectively transferred, the Piovego cases suggest that in practice the role of 
witnesses was purely to certify consent, leaving the details of transactions as an 
entirely private matter. 
The Piovego evidence re-situates individual acts of certification within the 
broader context of ongoing credit relations, allowing us to regard the notarial contract 
not as the record of a discrete transaction, but as serving a function in a developing 
relationship. In his secret denunciation of 1645, Giovanni Battista Boldini presented 
the story of his relations with the cloth merchant Gerolemo Baldissini, whom he 
GHVFULEHGDVDµZUHWFKHGPDQ¶µZLWKQRNQRZOHGJHRI*RGDQGQRFRQVFLHQFH¶80 
The story began with a stocco of 1641, when Boldini took out a loan in the form of 
glass beads priced at D120. This was a notional price that incorporated the interest ± 
when Boldini sold the beads using a Jewish broker, he only got D50 for them. The 
ORDQZDVWREHUHSDLGRYHUDSHULRGRIWZR\HDUVZLWKWKHUHQWDOLQFRPHRI%ROGLQL¶V
ZLIH¶VKRXVHLQ9HQLFH worth D60 per annum. When Boldini failed to repay, 
Baldissini gradually moved to take control of the property, a process involving two 
separate notarized contracts. The first was an annuity contract of 1642 by which 
Baldissini purchased the rental income of the house. The document stated that the 
price was D620, but Boldini only actually received D350, most of which consisted of 
the outstanding debt (plus interest) for the beads, supplemented by some rags 
valued at D63 (which were worth barely D15), a credit note for D100 against a third 
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party (who turned out be destitute and in exile) and small quantities of wine, 
stockings, shoes, and petty cash. The second contract of 1643 was for the outright 
purchase of the house. Although the stated price was D1,200, Boldini only received 
D1,000, a sum which included the outstanding debt of D620, supplemented by 
credits against third parties (one was bankrupt, another refused to pay anything) and 
VPDOOTXDQWLWLHVRIJRRGVDWLQIODWHGSULFHV%ROGLQL¶VFRPSODLQWZDVWKDt the prices in 
the contracts were fictional ± firstly, on grounds that he had not been paid the full 
amount; secondly, on grounds that no money had changed hands (since these 
contracts were actually made to cover pre-existing debts); thirdly, on grounds that he 
had been partly paid in goods at grossly inflated prices. 
The case of Francesco Mutti, discussed above, similarly shows how formal 
documentary records need to be understood within the context of the developing 
credit relationship, in which old debts were transformed into new loans with stronger 
forms of certification and additional guarantees. Mutti initially received credit from 
Grana in 1657 in the form of woollen cloth priced at D4,000, which he was only able 
to sell for half that value. SubsequenWO\OHJDOFRVWVUHJDUGLQJKLVEURWKHU¶VZLGRZ¶V
dowry)81 made it impossible for Mutti to repay the loan on time, and so Grana 
UHTXLUHGLWWREHUHFDVWLQWKHIRUPRIDPRUWJDJHLQZLWK0XWWL¶VSURSHUW\DV
collateral. Although the mortgage contract stated that Mutti received D6,000, no 
money was actually transferred; rather, this was to cover the existing debt for the 
woollen cloth, plus further interest charges covered by more overpriced goods. 
Although the mortgage contract specified interest of 5½% per annum, within the 
legal limit, the effective rate was higher because Mutti did not receive the full amount 
VWDWHGLQWKHFRQWUDFW6XEVHTXHQWO\0XWWLZDVRQO\DEOHWRDYRLG*UDQD¶VWKUHDWRI
legal action by contracting further loans. These transactions were presented as sales 
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of goods which were either never delivered to Mutti, or which consisted of overpriced 
MXQNEXWZKLFKLQIDFWµZHUHQRWKLQJEXWWKHLQWHUHVWGXHRQWKHDIRUHVDLG'
FDOFXODWHGDW¶82 These additional loans were rolled up into a second mortgage 
contract of 1660 for D3,000. By 1662, with the outstanding debt now over D10,000, 
Mutti signed a new contract incorporating all the previous mortgages. 
Creditors defended themselves by pointing to the official documentary record 
as proof that debtors had consented to the contract. As Grana asked in his defence 
µ+RZFRXOG0XWWLGHFODUHKLPVHOILQGHEWIRU'LIKHGLGQRWUHFHLYHWKLV"¶83 
1HYHUWKHOHVV0XWWL¶VFRPSODLQWUHYHDOHGKRZVRPHERG\PLJKWFRQQLYHLQDIUDXGDW
their own expense if that was a condition of obtaining credit, or if it was the only way 
to avoid a creditor taking legal action against them. Yet there were also practical 
steps that people might take to prepare for the eventuality of contesting their debts. 
Zuanne MutWLZKRJXDUDQWHHGKLVXQFOH)UDQFHVFR¶VGHEWVLQWKHPRUWJDJH
UHJLVWHUHGDµVHFUHWSURWHVW¶ZLWKDQRWDU\LQODWH7KLVZDVDVHDOHGGRFXPHQW
describing the nature of the fictions in which he had participated, for possible use in 
the future. WhHQRSHQHGLQLWGHVFULEHGKRZµQRWHYHQDbagattino [a small 
FRLQ@ZDVFRXQWHGRXWDOWKRXJKVRPHVDFNVZHUHVKRZQ,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWWKH\
FRQWDLQHGRULILWZDVPRQH\¶84 
The secret protest established legal grounds for subsequently challenging a 
contract on grounds of fraud. There is some evidence to suggest that this was not an 
exceptional practice. Immediately after Giacomo Gabrieli agreed to a ruinous loan in 
order to secure his release from jail, he summoned a notary to his cell to make a 
µVHFUHW SURWHVW¶GHQRXQFLQJWKHGHDODVDIUDXG85 In another case, Gabriel and Aron 
&DPLVGHVFULEHGKRZWKH\ZHUHLQGXFHGWRDEDQGRQOLWLJDWLRQE\WKHLUXQFOH¶VRIIHURI
a settlement. The deal was initially agreed orally, then concluded before a notary, to 
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be kept sealed until the brothers had formally dropped their claim. At the same time, 
KRZHYHUWKH&DPLVEURWKHUVUHJLVWHUHGDµVHFUHWSURWHVW¶WRNHHSRSHQWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of a future claim, on grounds that D12,000 was just a small proportion of their 
inheritanFHDQGWKDWWKH\KDGRQO\DJUHHGGXHWRµH[WUHPHQHHG¶86 Francesco Grana 
KLPVHOIUHJLVWHUHGDµVHFUHWSURWHVW¶ZLWKDQRWDU\LQµWREHRQO\RSHQHGLQFDVH
RIQHFHVVLW\¶ZKLFKKLVVRQRSHQHGLQ87 The use of this technique to 
undermine notarial contracts and arbitrated settlements indicates a further way in 
which litigants contributed to the lack of certainty in formal documentation. 
The case of Bortolo Loredan sums up these features of the credit economy, 
revealing how he obtained various loans by means of an intermediary without ever 
meeting the creditor, with the interest concealed behind various fictions. His opening 
UHPDUNVZHUHDJHQHUDODWWDFNRQµXVXULRXVFRQWUDFWV¶PDQLSXODWHGZLWKµVWXGLHG
FXQQLQJRIEURNHUV¶ZKLFKZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRU µUHGXFLQJWKHSUHFLRXVFDSLWDORI
IDPLOLHVWRDVKHV¶88 He described how he signed a credit note for raw silk priced at 
D1,000 by means of the intermediary Agapito Roncalli, payable over five months to 
the noblewoman Maria Capello Da Mosto. As collateral for the loan, he provided a 
mortgage credit in the name of his widowed mother. If the debt were not repaid 
within the time limit, then the income would be diverted to Capello Da Mosto. 
As was typical in such transactions, the interest was concealed in the price. 
Loredan claimed that the silk in the first loan was only worth D660, two thirds of the 
contracted price. In a second loan, although Roncalli counted out D700 in the form of 
silver coins before witnesses, he immediately took this money back when they had 
gone. The next day he gave only D400 to Loredan, half in the form of cash, and half 
in the form of two credit notes (one of them post-dated) which promised to pay the 
remainder. The condition for actually receiving these sums in cash was that Loredan 
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had to give Roncalli a fictitious quittance ± in other words, to formally acknowledge 
UHFHLSWRIWKHIXOO'/RUHGDQ¶VORVVHVZHUHFRPSRXQGHGE\WKHFRLQVEHLQJµROG
DQGPDGHVKLQ\ZLWKDUW¶ZKLFKKHDFFHSWHGUHOXFWDQWO\VD\LQJµKDYLQJGUXQNWKH
sea I ZLOODOVRGULQNWKLVODNH¶89 
5RQFDOOLZKRGHVFULEHGKLVSURIHVVLRQDVDµGHDOHU¶VHUYHGDVDVKLHOG
between creditor and debtor. Loredan never met Capello Da Mosto; nor did he even 
see the silk that he purchased, which Roncalli collected and converted into cash on 
KLVEHKDOI6LPLODUO\LQWKHVHFRQGORDQWKHJRRGVµUHPDLQHGDWWKHIUHHGLVSRVLWLRQRI
5RQFDOOLDVLQWHUPHGLDU\WRVHOO¶90 Loredan even suggested that the role of Capello 
da Mosto was merely a front, since Roncalli controlled the whole process from start 
to finish. If she did exist, then like other female and noble investors, she probably 
used intermediaries to keep a safe distance from debtors. 
Loredan made it clear that he had entered these contracts with full knowledge 
of what he was doing. Roncalli had clearly told him that for the notional debt of D700 
he would not receive more than D400.91 Nevertheless, this did not rule out the 
possibility of a claim, because the Piovego was interested not only in subjective 
fraud, but also in the objective fairness of the transaction. That same day, Loredan 
LPPHGLDWHO\WRRNVWHSVWRSURWHFWKLPVHOIKHUHJLVWHUHGWZRµVHFUHWSURWHVWV¶ZLWKD
notary stating that he was agreeing to these contracts out of necessity rather than 
free choice. In this way, he established an alternative, hidden transcript for future use 
DJDLQVWWKLVµLQIHFWHGVFDQGDORXVFRQWUDFW¶92 He further protected himself by having 
KLVDVVRFLDWHFROOHFWPRQH\XVLQJ5RQFDOOL¶VFKHTXHZKLFKZDVGUDZQRQDQ
apothecary shop. In this way, there was a witness to the transaction who could later 
be called upon to testify in court. 
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$OWKRXJKIHZGHEWRUVERWKHUHGWRIRUPDOO\UHJLVWHUµVHFUHWSURWHVWV¶ZLWK
notaries, it was relatively easy to obtain informal protection simply by discussing the 
transaction with third parties. In the case above, Loredan complained about the 
FRQWUDFWµLQVHFUHWFRQILGHQFH¶WRVHYHUDOSHRSOH93 Another common practice was to 
use intermediaries to pay instalments on loans, who might subsequently testify to the 
existence of the relationship. The second-hand dealer Giulio Parechiato testified how 
he had delivered bags of money on behalf of Andrea Cantin, who had repeatedly 
complained that these were interest payments for a loan at 10%.94 Similarly, the 
pastrycook Giacomo Bregenti delivered four gold coins on behalf of his neighbour 
Francesco Toffani. Although the creditor refused to provide a written receipt, 
%UHJHQWLZDVDEOHWRWHVWLI\WKDWSD\PHQWKDGWDNHQSODFH%\WDONLQJDERXWRQH¶V
affairs with third parties, and by using intermediaries to carry out payments, litigants 
could build up the evidence to support an alternative narrative, one which might be 
deployed in subsequent litigation. 
IV 
The Piovego sources indicate that the formal record of credit should be understood 
in the context of a broader range of practices that spanned the formal and informal 
economy. An unintended consequence of the usury laws was to encourage the 
manipulation of the documentary record in order to conceal the payment of interest. 
Even the most formal methods of certification, such as the notarial contracts used for 
mortgages, could be manipulated in this way, and should be approached with 
caution. Contracts for mortgages, annuities, and property sales could also be used to 
cover pre-existing debts, without any effective transfer of cash. The prices recorded 
for goods and property in such transactions must be regarded sceptically, due to the 
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potential inclusion of interest charges. The fraud cases highlight the need for critical 
awareness of the potential gap between contractual form and the substance of 
underlying relations between the parties. 
Although the usury ban was relatively easy to evade, this had the important 
effect of making contracts more ambiguous.95 Fictions significantly reduced the 
transparency of exchange: they disguised the true nature of loans and made it 
difficult for borrowers to negotiate effectively, compare loans, or understand how 
much they were really paying. At the same time, it was difficult for creditors to obtain 
reliable returns, due to the risks of debt litigation and a potential denunciation for 
usury or fraud. The ban on usury obliged personal loans to operate within a world of 
semi-legality in which trust was difficult to establish.96 As a result, many investors 
preferred to put their money in more legitimate sectors with lower returns. Those 
seeking to profit from personal loans benefitted from the lack of competition on the 
supply side, which allowed them to charge higher rates; on the other hand, higher 
rates were to some extent needed to cover the risks of incrimination and litigation, in 
addition to the possibility of default. From the NIE perspective, the lack of certainty in 
SURSHUW\ULJKWVPDGHHDUO\PRGHUQLQVWLWXWLRQVµLQHIILFLHQW¶FRPSDUHGWRPRGHUQ
market institutions.97 
Part of the agenda of NIE scholarship in analysing informal alongside formal 
institutions was to show that economic analysis can be applied to all kinds of 
societies ± in other words, that markets were a natural feature of human society. In 
the case of the economy of personal credit in early modern Venice, there are strong 
JURXQGVIRUTXHVWLRQLQJZKHWKHUDµPDUNHW¶H[LVWHG7KHUHZDVYHU\OLWWOHLQIRUPDWLRQ
about those willing to lend or borrow money; there was little transparency about the 
price, conditions, and terms of loans; individual transactions were embedded in 
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longer-term social relations. Rather than a market situation where borrowers 
compared prices and exercised choice between a range of providers, their agency 
was focused on the negotiation of debt within established relationships, what Geertz 
FDOOVµLQWHQVLYHEDUJDLQLQJ¶98 Against the contractual ideal of consenting equals, the 
cases reveal the radical asymmetries existing between people of very different 
bargaining power. Embedded credit relations might mean helping neighbours out of 
community spirit, social obligation, and Christian charity, but might also mean 
exploitation of those who lacked alternatives, even while presenting the loan as a 
µIDYRXU¶$OWKRXJKLQWHUPHGLDULHVSOD\HGDQimportant role in helping people to 
overcome the limitations of their social networks, they frequently did so as the 
trusted agents of the powerful and wealthy. 
Overall, the documentary record of early modern personal credit should be 
understood through a µWKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ¶WKDWFRQVLGHUVLWVUROHDVDUHVRXUFHLQWKLV
broader process of negotiation, embedded in long-term relationships, and operating 
within a flexible legal system that required formal property rights to be interpreted in 
context. Although it was possible to appeal to the principle of contractual will, as 
some of the litigants and witnesses did in the cases discussed here, institutions like 
the Piovego upheld the contrasting principle that the written document must be 
interpreted in relation WRLWVEURDGHUVXEVWDQWLYHHIIHFWV7KLVZDVDµPRUDOHFRQRP\¶
in which contracts were not just a private matter, but also a matter of public concern, 
in which formal instruments might be contested on grounds of their underlying 
fairness. Rather than interpreting the record according to ahistorical assumptions of 
PDUNHWEHKDYLRXUZHQHHGWRDFFHVVDSUHPRGHUQRUµEDURTXH¶PHQWDOLW\LQZKLFK
people were conscious of the potential divide between the written form and true 
substance or essence of relations. 
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